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HOLDING THAT THE FOREIGN
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITIES ACT DOES NOT
APPLY TO INDIVIDUALS ACTING WITHIN
THE SCOPE OF THEIR OFFICIAL DUTIES
Elizabeth Mills Viney*
IN Yousuf v. Samantar, the Fourth Circuit concluded that the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA),1 which protects foreign states and
their agencies or instrumentalities from suits in U.S. courts, does not
extend immunity to individual foreign officers acting within the scope of
their official state duties. 2 The Fourth Circuit reached this holding by
erroneously concluding that individual foreign officers do not fall within
the definition of agencies or instrumentalities of a foreign state for pur-
poses of the FSIA.3 The court improperly strayed from the circuit major-
ity view on sovereign immunity and ignored legislative intent, thereby
clouding this area of law, politicizing immunity decisions, and thickening
district court dockets.4
Following a Somalian coup d'6tat led by General Mohamed Barre in
1969, Mohamed Ali Samantar became a top official in the then-new So-
mali government.5 For many years following the coup, the Supreme Rev-
olutionary Council (SRC) and its Army Officers, including Samantar,
wielded power in Somalia and outlawed other political parties; in particu-
lar, the SRC "brutally oppressed the generally prosperous and well-edu-
cated Isaaq clan" because the clan was a potential threat to SRC power. 6
To further squelch opposition, government agents "engaged in the wide-
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1. 28 U.S.C. §§1602-1611 (2006).
2. Yousuf v. Samantar, 552 F.3d 371, 381 (4th Cir. 2009).
3. See id.
4. See id. at 378.




spread and systematic use of torture, arbitrary detention and extrajudicial
killing against the civilian population."7 Samantar, as "Minster of De-
fense from January 1980 to December 1986, and as Prime Minister from
January 1987 to September 1990," allegedly gave "tacit approval" for
much of the brutality inflicted upon Somali civilians.8 After many years
of oppression, the Barre regime finally collapsed in 1991 and many top
officials fled the country.9 Samantar eventually moved to Fairfax,
Virginia.' 0
On November 10, 2004, Bashe Abdi Yousuf and other natives of
Somalia brought a civil action in the United States to impose liability
upon and recover damages from Samantar, as former Minister of Defense
and Prime Minister of Somalia, for "alleged acts of torture and human
rights violations committed against them by the government agents com-
manded by Samantar." 1 Plaintiffs, all of whom are affiliated with the
Isaaq clan, alleged either that they were "personally subjected to [Sa-
mantar's] brutality" or that they represented family members who were
killed by his government agents. 12 "Plaintiffs do not allege that Samantar
personally" executed or directly involved himself in these crimes; rather,
he gave "tacit approval" to those who committed the atrocities.13 Due to
such approval, Plaintiffs argued that Samantar was liable for damages
under both the Alien Tort Statute (ATS) and the Torture Victims Protec-
tion Act (TVPA).14 The ATS grants federal subject-matter jurisdiction
when "an alien sues ... for a tort ... committed in violation of the law of
nations."' 5 The TVPA, on the other hand, provides that the victim may
bring "a civil action for damages" against the individual who committed
the torture while acting under apparent or actual authority of a foreign
state. 16 Plaintiffs argue that Samantar violated international law because
he "knew or should have known that his subordinates ... were commit-
ting . . . extrajudicial killings, . . . torture, crimes against humanity, war
crimes, [and] cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment."17
On August 1, 2007, the district court dismissed the action due to lack of
subject-matter jurisdiction because the FSIA, which provides that "a for-
eign state shall be immune from the jurisdiction of the courts of the
7. Id. at 374 (internal quotation marks omitted).
8. Id.
9. Id. General Mohamed Barre was the head of state of Somalia from 1969 to 1991.
See Richard Greenfield, Obituary: Mohamed Said Barre, INDEP., Jan. 3, 1995, at 12.
10. Yousuf v. Samantar, No. 1:04cv1360, 2007 WL 2220579, at *6 (E.D. Va. Aug. 1,
2007).
11. Yousuf, 552 F.3d at 373; Yousuf, 2007 WL 2220579, at *6.
12. Yousuf, 552 F.3d at 374. Plaintiffs Bashe Abdi Yousuf, Jane Doe, and John Doe II
brought this action alleging that they were personally subject to Barre regime brutality. Id.
Plaintiffs Aziz Mohamed Deria and John Doe I brought this action "as personal represent-
atives of the estates of family members." Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 374-75; see Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006); Torture Victim
Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-256, § 2(a), 106 Stat. 73, 73 (1992).
15. Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 238 (2d Cir. 1995).
16. Yousuf, 552 F.3d at 375.
17. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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United States,"18 entitled Samantar to immunity from suit.1 9 In a memo-
randum opinion, the district court held that Samantar was shielded by the
FSIA because "[t]he allegations in the complaint clearly describe Sa-
mantar, at all relevant times, as acting upon the directives of the then-
Somali government in an official capacity, and not for personal reasons or
motivation." 20 In so ruling, the district court followed the majority of fed-
eral circuits, holding that individuals acting in an official capacity are im-
mune from suit under the FSIA.21 Plaintiffs appealed the dismissal,
arguing, inter alia, that "Congress did not intend for individual foreign
officials to claim sovereign immunity under the FSIA," but only intended
that foreign states themselves be able to claim such immunity.22
In 1976, Congress enacted the FSIA to codify the common-law "restric-
tive theory of foreign sovereign immunity." 23 The common-law restric-
tive theory "permitted 'foreign states [to] be sued in United States courts
for their commercial acts, but not for their public acts." 24 Under this
theory, the Executive Branch decided the questions of sovereign immu-
nity for foreign states and their officials, which resulted in "'foreign na-
tions . . . plac[ing] diplomatic pressure"' on the Executive Branch
regarding immunity. 25 Therefore, Congress enacted the FSIA to "shift[ ]
responsibility . . . from the Executive Branch to the Judicial Branch . . .
'[and] to clarify the governing standards"' of sovereign immunity, which
were not clear under the common law.26 The text of the FSIA, however,
does not specifically include individuals acting within the scope of their
official government capacities as part of a foreign state or its agency or
instrumentality.27 This lack of specificity regarding individuals in the stat-
utory text has engendered varying interpretations of the FSIA.28
The Fourth Circuit's Yousuf opinion, written by Judge Traxler, went
against the majority of circuits by limiting the language of the FSIA and
holding that individuals are not covered by the Act; the court reversed
the district court's judgment and remanded it for further proceedings on
18. Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1604 (2006)).
19. Yousuf v. Samantar, No. 1:04cv1360, 2007 WL 2220579, at *15 (E.D. Va. Aug. 1,
2007).
20. Yousuf, 552 F.3d at 376 (internal quotations marks omitted).
21. See Chuidian v. Philippine Nat'l Bank, 912 F.2d 1095, 1103 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding
that an individual foreign official acting within the scope of his official duties qualifies as an
"agency or instrumentality of a foreign state"); see also In re Terrorist Attacks on Sept. 11,
2001, 538 F.3d 71, 83 (2d Cir. 2008); Keller v. Cent. Bank of Nig., 277 F.3d 811, 815-16 (6th
Cir. 2002); Byrd v. Corporacion Forestal y Industrial de Olancho S.A., 182 F.3d 380, 388-89
(5th Cir. 1999); El-Fadl v. Cent. Bank of Jordan, 75 F.3d 668, 671 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
22. Yousuf, 552 F.3d at 377.
23. Id.; see Velasco v. Gov't of Indon., 370 F.3d 392, 397 (4th Cir. 2004) (citing Argen-
tine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 434-39 (1989)).
24. Yousuf, 552 F.3d at 377 (quoting Amerada Hess, 488 U.S. at 431 n.1).
25. Id. (quoting Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nig., 461 U.S. 480, 487 (1983)).
26. Id. at 377-78 (quoting Verlinden B.V., 461 U.S. at 488).
27. Id. at 378.




the merits.29 The Yousuf court reached its holding by first looking at the
text of the FSIA:
"[A]gency or instrumentality of a foreign state" means any entity-
(1) which is a separate legal person, corporate or otherwise, and (2)
which is an organ of a foreign state or political subdivision thereof,
or a majority of whose shares or other ownership interest is owned
by a foreign state or political subdivision thereof, and (3) which is
neither a citizen of a State of the United States as defined in section
1332(c) and (e) of this title . . . .30
The court determined that, because the words "individuals or natural
persons" are not in the text, it is unclear whether Congress intended indi-
viduals to be covered.3' Quoting the Seventh Circuit, the court deter-
mined that the phrase "separate legal person" has the "ring of the
familiar legal concept that corporations are persons," and "[i]f Congress
meant to include individuals . . . in the scope of the FSIA, it would have
done so in clear and unmistakable terms." 32 The court concluded, there-
fore, that "the phrase 'separate legal person' suggests that corporations or
other business entities, but not natural persons, may qualify as agencies or
instrumentalities." 3 3 The court supported its holding by quoting a House
Committee Report on the FSIA, which explains that the phrase "'sepa-
rate legal person' was 'intended to include a corporation, association,
foundation, or any other entity which . .. can sue or be sued in its own
name."
34
Under the Fourth Circuit's holding, Samantar, as an individual, is not
shielded under the FSIA from suit in the United States. 35 In reaching this
conclusion, the court made no distinction between individuals acting for
personal reasons and those acting in an official government capacity-
both are outside the reach of the FSIA. The court, however, did refine its
holding by noting that it only excluded Samantar from immunity under
the FSIA, and "whether he can successfully invoke an immunity doctrine
arising under pre-FSIA common law is an open question." 36
The Fourth Circuit's holding in Yousuf is incorrect for three reasons.
The holding goes against the Fourth Circuit precedent in Velasco v. Gov-
ernment of Indonesia,37 it disregards the legislative history and intent of
the FSIA, and it duplicates the efforts of federal district courts in sover-
29. Yousuf, 552 F.3d at 383-84.
30. 28 U.S.C. § 1603(b) (2006).
31. Yousuf, 552 F.3d at 378.
32. Id. at 380 (quoting Enahoro v. Abubakar, 408 F.3d 877, 881-82 (7th Cir. 2005)).
33. Id. (emphasis added).
34. Id. at 381 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, at 15 (1976), reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604, 6614).
35. Id.
36. Id. at 383-84.
37. 370 F.3d 392 (4th Cir. 2004).
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eign immunity claims. 38 The Velasco court noted that "[c]laims against the
individual in his . . . capacity [as a state official] are the practical
equivalent of claims against the foreign state."39 The Yousuf court, how-
ever, concluded that "Velasco was not about whether an individual gov-
ernment official was entitled to sovereign immunity . . .. Rather, it was
about whether the [foreign] government was bound, through agency prin-
ciples, by the unauthorized acts of individual government officials." 40 Yet,
according to agency law, an individual may bind an entity only if he is an
agent of that entity.41 Therefore, if the Velasco court found that an indi-
vidual could bind his government through agency principles, then it de
facto held that such an individual, by his ability to bind the government, is
an agent of that government.42 As an agent of the government, such an
individual would necessarily fall under the umbrella of the FSIA,43 mak-
ing the analysis and holding in Velasco directly applicable and preceden-
tial to the Yousuf case. Because Velasco is precedential, the Yousuf
holding goes against both the majority of its sister circuits, as well as its
own circuit, in order to support an incorrect interpretation of the FSIA.4 4
The court in Yousuf incorrectly interpreted the FSIA because it disre-
garded legislative intent by taking away the certainty that the FSIA was
intended to instate, failing to look at the pre-1976 sovereign immunity
law that the FSIA codified, and transferring the job of determining im-
munity back to the Executive Branch. 45 First, the Yousuf holding re-in-
troduced uncertainty regarding foreign sovereign immunity law that
Congress intended the FSIA to eradicate. The House Committee Report
on the FSIA states that it was enacted because "[a]t present, there are no
comprehensive provisions in our law available to inform parties when
they can have recourse to the courts to assert a legal claim against a for-
eign state."46 If government officials acting in their official capacity are
not included in the FSIA, it is unclear whether or in what circumstances
government officials have sovereign immunity. This lack of clarity is pre-
cisely what Congress intended to eliminate by enacting the FSIA, and
what the Fourth Circuit reinstated with its interpretation of the statute.
Second, the court failed to recognize that the FSIA, when enacted,
codified the existing common law of sovereign immunity, which-accord-
ing to the Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations Law-extended to
the "head of state . . . [or] any other public minister, official, or agent of
38. See Sarah Wappett-Kendall, 4th Circuit Removes FSIA Hurdle to Most Torture
Suits, GEO. L. CENTER ON NAT'L SECURITY & L., Feb., 11, 2009, http://www.securitylaw
brief.com/commentary/2009/02/4th-circuit-removes-fsia-hurdle-to-most-torture-suits.html.
39. Velasco, 370 F.3d at 399.
40. Yousuf, 552 F.3d at 379.
41. See United States v. Ferber, 966 F. Supp. 98, 100 (D. Mass. 1997).
42. See id.
43. See 28 U.S.C. § 1603(a) (2006) ("A 'foreign state' . . . includes ... an agency or
instrumentality of a foreign state . . . .")
44. See Yousuf, 552 F.3d at 378-79.
45. See H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, at 1-2 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604,
6605-06; see also Wappett-Kendall, supra note 38.
46. H.R. ReP. No. 94-1487, at 1 (emphasis added).
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the state with respect to acts performed in his official capacity." 47 Since
the FSIA was intended to codify the prevailing common law, it must in-
clude some individuals within its sweep.48 Otherwise, the FSIA would
not have codified, but seriously altered, preceding common law.49 The
Yousuf court itself recognizes that Samantar could "successfully invoke
an immunity doctrine arising under pre-FSIA common law."50 If the
FSIA codified the pre-FSIA common law immunity doctrine, then why
would Samantar need to go back to that same common law to find sover-
eign immunity?
Third, Congress intended that the FSIA "discontin[uel the practice of
judicial deference to suggestions of immunity from the executive branch;"
interpretation of the FSIA is "a pure question of statutory construc-
tion."51 By holding that the FSIA does not encompass individuals acting
within the scope of their official duties, the court brings the Executive
Branch back into the determination of sovereign immunity. Under the
Yousuf holding, "Samantar and future defendants will have to rely on
[pre-FSIA] 'common law immunities,"' meaning that immunity will be
"subject to the opinion of the Executive Branch as articulated by the
State Department as to whether [common-law] act of state or head of
state immunity should apply."5 2 This is contrary to the congressional in-
tent that the FSIA "depoliticize sovereign immunity decisions." 53
Further, the Yousuf holding will substantially increase suits in district
courts. The Yousuf rule "will encourage more suits against properly im-
mune defendants . . . and force them to litigate on the merits in order to
avail themselves of common law immunities."54 As the Fourth Circuit
admitted, defendants such as Samantar and other foreign top officials
may very well gain immunity under common law.5 5 Therefore, excluding
from the FSIA such individuals acting within the scope of their official
duties does not serve to "punish" those who would otherwise evade jus-
tice, but rather serves only to clog federal district courts with civil litiga-
tion on the merits against defendants who likely have immunity through
other avenues.
Even if individuals acting in their official capacities do have immunity
under the FSIA, they are by no means escaping recompense for their
wrongdoings. There are other means by which plaintiffs may reach these
47. Chuidian v. Philippine Nat'l Bank, 912 F.2d 1095, 1099-1100 (9th Cir. 1990); see
H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, at 2; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONs LAw § 66
(1965).
48. Chuidian, 912 F.2d at 1101.
49. Id.
50. Yousuf v. Samantar, 552 F.3d 371, 383-84 (4th Cir. 2009).
51. H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, at 6 (internal citations omitted); see Republic of Austria v.
Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 701 (2004) (internal citations omitted).
52. Wappett-Kendall, supra note 38.
53. Jack Alan Levy, As Between Princz and King: Reassessing the Law of Foreign Sov-
ereign Immunity as Applied to Jus Cogens Violators, 86 GEO. L.J. 2703, 2709 (1998).
54. Wappett-Kendall, supra note 38.
55. Yousuf, 552 F.3d at 383-84.
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defendants: courts may certainly conclude that government officials, by
committing acts of torture, are not within the scope of their official state
duties and are thereby unprotected under the FSIA.5 6 Further, as the
Second Circuit noted, "[d]eterrence (or punishment) does not begin and
end with civil litigation" because "[o]ur government has other means at
its disposal-sanctions, trade embargos, diplomacy, military action-
to . . . deter (or punish) foreign sovereigns."57
In Yousuf v. Samantar, the Fourth Circuit should not have excluded
individuals acting within the scope of their official duties from immunity
under the FSIA, disregarding both its sister circuits and its own circuit's
precedent. The Fourth Circuit ignored legislative history by clouding an
area of law that the FSIA meant to clarify, by disregarding the common
law that the FSIA codified, and by politicizing an area of law that Con-
gress intended the FSIA to depoliticize.58 By overlooking the key differ-
ence between individuals acting for personal reasons and those acting
pursuant to official duties, the Fourth Circuit substantially departed from
the legislative intent of the FSIA and will promote further litigation for
defendants, who may already be immune under the common law and who
should be forced to provide redress for their wrongdoings by alternative
methods.59 While individuals such as Samantar should indeed pay recom-
pense to the civilians they harmed, excluding individuals acting within the
scope of their official duties from the FSIA is not the proper avenue.
56. S. REP. No. 102-249, at 7 (1991) (discussing the scope of liability under the TVPA
and noting that "because no state officially condones torture or extrajudicial killings, few
such acts, if any, would fall under the rubric of 'official actions' taken in the course of an
official's duties").
57. In re Terrorist Attacks on Sept. 11, 2001, 538 F.3d 71, 90 (2d Cir. 2008).
58. See H.R. REP. No., 94-1487, at 1-2 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604,
6605-06; Wappett-Kendal, supra note 38.
59. See S. REP. No. 102-249, at 7; see also In re Terrorist Attack on Sept. 11, 2001, 538
F.3d at 90.
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